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RECENT DECISIONS

VENDOR AND PtraCHASER-VENDOR's RELEASE oF SuB-AsslGNEE HELD
DrscHARGE OF ALL PRIOR AssIGNEEs - The bank for which plaintiff is
receiver sold land on contract. There followed four successive assignments of
the vendee's interest, in each of which the assignee expressly assumed the contract obligation. After the fourth assignment, default occurred as to payments
and taxes, and plaintiff began negotiations to sell the property to an intermediate
assignee, R. To effectuate this sale, plaintiff procured an assignment in blank
from the fourth assignee, W, in consideration of a release of W from further
liability on the contract. The negotiations with R having failed, plaintiff brought
suit against the vendee and all the assignees to foreclose the land contract and to
obtain a decree for deficiency. Held, two justices dissenting, the vendor's conduct
in releasing a sub-assignee terminated the liability of the vendee and all intermediate assignees who had assumed the-contract. McCurdy fJ, Van Os, 290
Mich. 492, 287 N. W. 890 (r939).
In giving the vendee and intervening grantees the benefit of suretyship
defenses, this decision extended to land contracts the generally accepted rule of
mortgages whereby a mortgagor who has transferred land to an assuming
grantee may assert the defenses of a surety with regard to subsequent dealings
between the mortgagee and the grantee.1 According to most decisions, if the
mortgagee extends time of payment to the grantee,11 or releases the grantee from
A

1 The courts have habitually dealt with a transfer of mortgaged land to an assuming grantee in terms of suretyship; the assuming grantee being the principal debtor
and the mortgagor, the surety. 41 C. J. 737 (1926); 22 FotrnTH DECENNIAL DIGEST,
"Mortgages," § 283 (1); 2 JoNES, MoRTGAGES, 8th ed., § 920 (1928); 3 PoMEROY,
EQUITY JurusPRUDENcE, 4th ed., § 1206 (1918); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev.
ed., § 384 (1936); S TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 1445 (1939). Intermediate grantees who have assumed the mortgage stand in the same position as the
mortgagor in this respect and are given the benefit of suretyship defenses.
2 Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187, 12 S. Ct. 437
(1892); 2 JoNEs, MoRTGAGES, 8th ed., § 922 (1928). See 41 A. L. R. 277 (1926);
4 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 469 (1937).
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the obligation,3 or otherwise alters the obligation of the grantee, the mortgagor
has a complete defense. The principal decision is representative of decisions
extending suretyship defenses to quasi-suretyship situations. Suretyship terminology provides a convenient means of describing a multitude of situations in
which one person is liable for the debt of another. But the application of suretyship labels has been accompanied by the application of suretyship defenses. For
example, a grantee who purch_ased land incumbered by a judgment lien was
held to stand in the position of a surety and was discharged by reason of a release
given the sureties on the judgment debtor's appeal bond. 4 The wisdom of adopting all the incidents of suretyship without inquiry into business policy and business practice is questionable. 5 In view of the analogy between mortgages and land
contracts, application of suretyship defenses to both situations was logical. But
the extension is to be regretted, no matter how logically it followed. The defenses
themselves need a re-examination and revision. Even when applied to what is
Jooked upon as technical suretyship, these defenses have been criticized. Courts
and text writers have experienced difficulty in explaining the theories underlying
them,6 and their drastic and unexpected consequences have been a source of
injustice.7 Furthermore, these defenses are doubly treacherous when applied to
situations like the land contract and mortgage cases, where the creditor does not
suspect that a suretyship relation is involved. 8 The result reached in the principal case could more properly be based on the ground that the vendor bank,
by retaking possession, renting the premises, and dealing with the property for
two years as owner, had discharged the contract.9

Robert M. Warren
8 The statement in the principal case is typical: "It is elementary that if the bank
by its dealings with Wiersum [ the fourth assignee] released him, such release terminated
the liability of prior assignees who had agreed to perform the terms of this contract."
290 Mich. 492 at 505. See Gilliam v. McLemore, 141 Miss. 253, 106 So. 99 (1925);
and Insley v. Webb, 122 Wash. 98, 209 P. 1093 (1922). Annotation, 41 A. L. R. 277
at 311 (1926). The dissenting justices refused to apply suretyship defenses to land
contracts, though they admitted that such defenses could be properly asserted by a
mortgagor. Yet their ground of distinction is not clear.
4 Barnes v. Mott, 64 N. Y. 397 (1876).
5 In many cases the courts have mechanically followed the suggestion of Pomeroy
that "all the consequences flowing from the relationship of suretyship" must follow.
3 PoMEROY, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENcE,•4th ed.,§ 1206, p. 2882 (1918). In general,
there is an absence of inquiry "whether there are elements in the situation not present
in simple suretyship cases, which make a particular suretyship doctrine inapplicable."
38 HARV. L. REV. 502 at 504, note 15 (1925). See Glassie, "The Assuming Vendee,"
9 VA. L. REv. 196 (1923); 4 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 469 (1937).
6 See 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., §§ 1220, 1222, 1225 (1936); ARANT,
SURETYSHIP, §§ 49, 68 (1931).
1 Cf. CARDozo, THE NATURE oF THE JuoICIAL PROCESS 153 (1921); Durfee,
"Review of Arant on Suretyship," 17 CoRN. L. Q. 707 at 709 (1932).
8 See 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 1440 (1939); and Glassie, "The
Assuming Vendee," 9 VA. L. REV. 196 (1923). Cf. Union Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v.
Hanford, 143 U.S. 187 at 190, 12 S. Ct. 437 (1892).
9 See concurring opinion by Justice Potter in the principal case, 290 Mich. at 516.

